Following the White Line: Regarding the Involvement of the CIA in Nicaraguan Drug Running by Tipton, Nicholas
Western Oregon University 
Digital Commons@WOU 
Student Theses, Papers and Projects (History) Department of History 
3-9-2004 
Following the White Line: Regarding the Involvement of the CIA in 
Nicaraguan Drug Running 
Nicholas Tipton 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wou.edu/his 





Following the White Line: Regarding the Involvement of the CIA
in Nicaraguan Drug Running
Conspiracies abound on the internet, and given time, chances are that you will run
across one that involves the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the
organization within the federal government responsible for foreign intelligence gathering
and covert policy enforcement. While the suspicions concerning this agency vary from
the conspiracy belief that they orchestrated the assassination of John F. Kennedy to that
they are in direct communication with aliens, there are instances when their secret
activities have been found to be illegal and all to real, as evidenced by assassinations that
they admit to doing following congressional banning and to their unsuccessful
experimentation with LSD as a truth serum. LSD is not the only drug that has been tied to
CIA activities, as rumors both Heroin and Cocaine have also crossed the historical trail of
the agency, some merely alleged, others substantiated. In August ofl996, Gary Webb of
the San Jose Mercury News wrote a three part series of articles under the title of "Dark
Alliance" that would seek to firmly substantiate the connection of the Crack cocaine
explosion in Los Angeles during the Mid-eighties to dealers associated with and funding
the Contra army of Nicaragua, which was also bank rolled off and on by the CIA. Webb's
series implicated the CIA in aiding and abetting the Contras in their drug trafficking
without ever directly stating it. The fallout from the article series was quick and
overwhelming, with most major publications (notably the New York Times and the
Washington Post) immediately dismissing Webb's findings and research as fictitious and
conspiracy theory based, while the CIA simultaneously denied any involvement with
drug trafficking in any form. While later investigations into the agency by an independent
investigator showed at least minor involvement in the Nicaraguan drug program, and a
later Washington Post article would retract many of the arguments against Webb that had
previously been raised, the issue of CIA involvement in the Nicaraguan drug trafficking
was largely swept under the rug. Based upon the investigative reporting of Webb and
several others, along with the findings of the Independent investigation and knowledge of
the CIA's past with Narcotics, it becomes apparent that while the CIA never relied upon
an executive order to push drugs within our border, they are responsible for consorting
with and funding drug runners, providing materiel support to drug runners and for
protecting those Nicaraguan Contras involved in the drug trade from both prosecution
and investigation by the CIA itself.
There are important aspects of this topic that must be examined and tackled
separately, though. Central to understanding the CIA involvement with suspected drug
traffickers is learning of their past involvement with Narcotics, starting with their
experimentation with Marijuana and LSD as truth serums during the second world war, to
their endorsement and active involvement in Opium trafficking in Laos, Cambodia and
vietnam during the vietnam war, to the CIA's Working with Afghani warlords
responsible for producing the lion's share of world opium during the 1990's. The CIA's
involvement with the Nicaraguan Contras themselves must be examined, from the
beginning of involvement, through the Iran-Contra affair, to the resolution of fighting
between the Contras and Sandinista government. Finally, the CIA's stonewalling
following the publishing of Webb's article must be examined and the extent to which
departmental negligence and outright breaking of laws was a part of the agency's
Nicaraguan plan.
The CIA, which grew out of the wartime Office of Strategic Services (OSS), was
chartered to provide both human and technology based intelligence gathering during the
expanding cold war. In addition to their role as intelligence advisors to the executive
branch, they were also created for the purpose of "Conducting counterintelligence
activities, special activities, and other functions related to foreign intelligence and
national security, as directed by the President"l, a category of activities that ranges from
apprehending foreign terrorists to the utilization of special operatives to assist the US
military. The CIA has had several different occurrences of connection to drug running in
the 57 years of its existence, starting most notably with the allegations of Opium
smuggling by CIA pilots in Christopher Robbins'sl979 bookAir America.2 While this
book would later be turned into a movie in 1990, the basic facts concerning the veracity
of Robbins's statements are notably backed up by Alfred w. Mccoy3, who would find
that during the 60's the only method of transport from the mountains of Laos where the
I According_to the official CIA website, as can be accessed at http://www .cia.govtcialinformatior/info.html
'Robbins, Christopher. Air America: The story of the CIA's Seciet Airlines. G.P. putnam's sons, New
York, 1979
3 Mccoy, Alfred W. The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia. Harper & Row. New york. 1972
opium was produced to the lowlands of Vietnam and Cambodia was through CIA planes
that continued to operate into the area, during the largest selling period for Laotian
Opiuma. The CIA has adamantly refuted these allegations, and maintains that the only
way that the opium could have gotten aboard their planes was in extremely small
numbers by individual smugglers, which according to the research of William fuary was
extremely rares. What both sides do admit is that it is certain that some pilots involved in
the Air America system for the transportation of goods to Laos were involved in the
trafficking of opiates, and that the CIA was slow to penalize and remove them from the
job.
Following the overthrow of the left leaning rulers of Afghanistan in 1979 by that
nation's communist party, the CIA was instructed to begin assisting the tribal leaders who
would begin a guerilla battle against the communists within their country and later the
Soviet Union when their army invaded to assist in the clearing out of the anti-communist
forces6. Many of these tribal leaders, including a younger Osama Bin Laden, were also
heavily involved in the production of Heroin and other opium products, which accounted
for upwards of 3 quarters of the nation's economy. This support of drug producers would
cause an enoflnous strain on CIA relations with the Drug Enforcement Agency, as the
CIA routinely would protect the interests of their Afghani supporters from the
prosecution of the DEA.7 While the activities to protect drug tsars in Afghanistan were
n tbia, p.t5z
l!"qr' William M. "CIA Air Operations in Laos, Ig55-1g74" . Journal of Military History 1995, vol.53
" Prados, John. "Notes On The CIA's Secret War In Afghanistan" in Journal of American History 2OO2
vol.89(2)
'Ibid, para.l0
not put up as an executive order within the agency, there was a strong trend to keep from
labeling the use of drug trafficking to raise funds as illegal within the agency.8
Following the rise to power of Daniel Ortega's leftist Government of National
Reconstruction (GRN) in Nicaragua in lg7g,relations between the US and the new
Sandinista government quickly cooled. By 1981, then President Carter cut off all aid to
the Nicaraguan country because of their socialist leaning policies.e As the Sandinista
government drifted closer and closer to the Soviet Union and Cuba, the government
sought to assists the opponents of the GRN financially and materially, the government
began it's financing of the Contras. Initially the funding allocation for the newly created
Central American Task Force of the CIA was $19 million dollars for 1981-82, and they
were instructed to begin delivering this money in the form of equipment and agency
advisors to the Contras within the year. By 1983, the spending limit set by congress was
moved up to $24 million, $21 million short of what the CIA deemed necessary to
properly assist the insurgency. After this money was used up, congress prohibited any
money from being used to finance the Contras until 1986 when congress authorized gl00
million for Contra support for the next two years. Shortly after 1987 hostilities ended and
American aid was changed back to entirely humanitarian and not insurgency assistance.
Later investigations would find that the two years that congress had not funded the
contras, the CIA had covered for monetarily by the selling of missiles and other
weaponry to kan in the infamous Iran-Contra affair and through various other private
sector funds accruement models that the agency established to continue the war without
congress's assistance. It is specifically during the time period of 1982 to 1986 that some
8 Hitz, Frederick P. "Obscuring Propriety: The CIA and Drugs" in International Joarnal of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence Oct99 Volume 12, Number 4
e Ibid, pp.45l
portions of the Contra armies turn to drug trafficking as a system for maintaining
funding.lo
The Contra forces were separated geographically, with the Sandino Revolutionary
Front (FRS) and Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE) operating along the
southern border and the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN) operating in the North. By
1982 ARDE and FRS had merged and thus began the CIA's funding of both the FDN and
the newly combined ARDE/FRS. Most of the supply and training for these two groups
would be run from the CIA's regional headquarters in Honduras, with a massive influx of
advisors coming south in the early 1980s. While Congress enacted legislation that
prohibited any supplying of funds in the area for anything outside of illegal arms
interdiction, during 1983, the CIA directly supplied money, arms, training and support for
the Contras against the congressional order.ll
Out of this scenario of direct CIA involvement evolved the allegations of CIA
complicity in drug running. Starting in 1981, there was a deluge of Crack trafficking into
San Francisco and Los Angeles in Califomia, where from 1983- 1992 the annual cocaine
related hospital emergencies jumped from 40 annually to 2,284.12 Gary Webb, then a
journalist for the San Jose Mercury News was investigating the influx of crack cocaine
when he was tipped off to the case of two civilian supporters of the Contras who were
under trial for Narcotics smuggling: Ricky Ross, who was primarily a dealing agent for
crack, and Oscar Danilo Blandon Reyes, a Nicaraguan expatriate. In Webb's article
'o Ibid, pp.454
" rbid, p.453
12 New York Amsterdam News; I2l2ltg6,Vol. 87 Issue 5l
series, Reyes and Ross are found to be responsible for bringing in a eelorrrl3 of crack
during the mid eighties. Webb then alleged that the majority of these profits were then
directly funneled to "a Latin American guerrilla army run by the US CIA"I4. While
Webb, in his article series never specifically states that the CIA ran the operation of drug
running, he does elude to their complicity in it's occurence, with it being even more
pointedly emphasized by the Mercury News' website with the CIA depanment seal
imposed on the background of pictures of crack use. What the article series did have in
spades was thoroughly researched numbers for drug movement and profit flow that
firmly traced the money and drugs back to Meneses Cantarero, a friend of Anastasio
Somoza who provided immense financial support to the contra cause, specifically during
the low funding years of 1984-85. Cantarero could reliably be traced as one of the most
direct ties for crack movement from Columbia to the United States, using profits
skimmed off the top to purchase American made weaponry and training.
Where Webb's article most directly implicated the CIA was in its attempt to
prove that Ross and Reyes were protected from prosecution by the agency. Here Webb's
urge for the dramatic overtook the veracity of his research, with the only proof of ties to
the CIA being found in Ross and Reyes' defense testimonies. These Webb misquoted to
the point of illegibility and failed to cross check with an objective account of the
government's official doings during the same time period.15
Aside from omitting key facts and failing to cross check his information, Webb
was mainly responsible for over sensationalizing his story. While he had struck
13 Kornbluh, Peter. "The Storm over Dark Alliance".In Columbia Journalism Review. JanlFeb 1997 Vol.35
Issue 5. p.35
ra Webb, Gary. "'Crack' Plague's Roots Are In Nicaraguan War". San Jose MercuryNews August 1996
rs Kornbluh, p.37
joumalistic gold with his discovery of Cantarero's involvement with the drug trade into
Los Angeles (which would become a CIA tie drug trade into Los Angeles because of
their financial and materiel support of Cantarero), he chose to press home the
involvement of Reyes and Ross, both of whom were not directly involved with the CIA
and were actually just common drug dealers for most intents and purposes.l6 Because of
the holes in the story and the sensationalist way that his thesis was put forth, 'Dark
Alliance' was quickly jumped upon by the more established media and its information
discredited as yet another conspiracy theory. Both the New York TimeslT and the
Washington Postls ran stories, initially in back page placement that directly disputed
Webb's findings. After the 'Dark Alliance' series gained momentum through high
internet readership and the globbing on of conspiracy theorists to its cause, both were
forced to write more direct front pagele and opinion page2o rebuttals.
In response to Webb's allegations, the CIA denounced all charges and then CIA
director John Deutch agreed to the use of an independent investigation into the event to
prove the CIA's innocence. This investigation, run by the Inspector General of the CIA
Frederick P.Iiltz, while proving that the CIA did not have direct contact with Ross and
Reyes and therefore is free from guilt in the allegations to their trafficking of drugs into
Los Angeles, also subtly points to the CIA's knowledge of its involvement with drug
traffickers. Hitz finds that the agency purposefully kept drug trafficking off its list of
crimes requiring reporting to the department of justice in relation to its operatives and
'u ibid, p.38
'7 Golden, Tim. '"Tale of CIA and Drugs Has Life of it's Own" New York Times, l)t2Ltg6 vol. 146 Issue
50587 p.Al
18 Kurtz, Howard. "Running with the CIA Story" Washington Post News Feed lOt2l96, Vol. 119 Issue 302,
pB1
re Kurtz, Howard. Fletcher, Michael A. "CIA series 'fell short'editor says" Washington Post News Feed;
O5ll3l97, Vol. 120Issue 159, pAl
20 Editorial. "The CIA and Drugs" New YorkTimes: llt5lg6,vol. 146Issue 50602, P.A22
informants. In cases of other drug dealing contras outside of Cantarero, the CIA was
found to be extremely slow in verifying there involvement with drug smuggling, and in
several cases continuing to deal with them after there drug trafficking activities had been
substantiated.2r Hitz's investigation found that when laws were changed as to the ability
of their employees and contacts to be involved in drug trading, their Nicaraguan contacts
were shifted to the categories that were protected.
It is because of the discrepancies between the research that Webb followed and
the CIA's own investigation that makes Webb's case hard to accept. While there is
definite proof of CIA involvement with drug traffickers, Webb attempted to draw a direct
line of involvement of the CIA in the trafficking itself, a conclusion that lacks basic facts.
The truth in the matter, and quite probably the more important story, is that the CIA
continued to operate and fund individuals that it knew, on at least an operative if not
executive level, were involved in the trafficking of crack cocaine into the United States.
While this summation does not fuel the desires of conspiracy theorists, it does provide a
strong indictment against the CIA. Whether within the context of the anti-Sandinista
movement, or within a vacuum, the CIA's involvement with drug traffickers by all rights
should have been a major scandal, but do to sensationalist reporting and inaccurate
statements, the important message of Webb's 'Dark Alliance' series killed whatever
public furor would be felt by the CIA. Because of this failure to properly represent the
realities of the CIA's drug ties, the agency is likely to have future dealings with those
who are engaged in the international narcotics trade.
" ltit .Pp454-456
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